China enacted the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law effective from 1 July 2026, which extends extraterritorial jurisdiction to foreigners, differing from Australian laws with extraterritorial application that primarily apply to Australian citizens or residents globally.
What's happening
China enacted the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law effective from 1 July 2026, which extends extraterritorial jurisdiction to foreigners, differing from Australian laws with extraterritorial application that primarily apply to Australian citizens or residents globally.
Where the evidence points
The ethnic unity law will have substantial deterrent effect on foreign academics and journalists. Many will engage in self-censorship or withdraw from research and reporting on sensitive topics related to China, not because they face actual prosecution, but because the legal threat—combined with China's demonstrated capacity to pursue critics overseas (Yang Hengjun, Gui Minhai, post-Hong Kong warrant issuances)—creates reputational and personal security risks that change their cost-benefit calculus.
Based on 4 sources across 4 regions.Evidence on this has been independently challenged and assessed.
Key questions
▸
Will the ethnic unity law effectively deter lawful criticism of China by foreign academics and journalists?
Evidence suggests: The law will deter criticism by making the legal and personal risks too high
Ranks compare these explanations against each other; the parenthetical is how likely each one is on its own.
Weighing the available reporting, these explanations rank by evidence:
Most likely: The law will deter criticism by making the legal and personal risks too high (possible)
Best case for The law will deter criticism by making the legal and personal risks too high
- China is building an integrated legal architecture for strategic competition comprising counter-espionage legislation, data security laws, anti-foreign sanctions measures, state secrets reforms and the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law that reveals a coherent strategy for extending Chinese state power beyond China's borders through law.
- Chinese domestic law increasingly serves as an instrument for strategic competition used to shape behaviour overseas, influence public debate and deter criticism of issues China considers fundamental to regime security.
- The possibility of Chinese legal action against lawful Australian conduct may encourage self-censorship or deter engagement among Australian academics, journalists and policy analysts, which is the clear intent of the law.
For: The law will deter criticism by making the legal and personal risks too high
- China is building an integrated legal architecture for strategic competition comprising counter-espionage legislation, data security laws, anti-foreign sanctions measures, state secrets reforms and the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law that reveals a coherent strategy for extending Chinese state power beyond China's borders through law. 1 source, analysis
- The Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law institutionalises President Xi Jinping's vision of a single Chinese national identity requiring schools, universities, media organisations, technology companies, employers and community organisations to reinforce that objective. 1 source, editorial
- The possibility of Chinese legal action against lawful Australian conduct may encourage self-censorship or deter engagement among Australian academics, journalists and policy analysts, which is the clear intent of the law. 1 source, analysis
- China's Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law claims legal authority to pursue people outside the People's Republic of China whose conduct China views as undermining ethnic unity or promoting ethnic division. 1 source, editorial
- Chinese domestic law increasingly serves as an instrument for strategic competition used to shape behaviour overseas, influence public debate and deter criticism of issues China considers fundamental to regime security. 1 source, analysis
Challenging evidence
No strong challenging evidence
Less likely: Foreign journalists and academics will largely ignore the law as unenforceable (very unlikely)
Best case for Foreign journalists and academics will largely ignore the law as unenforceable
- Hong Kong national security law asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction.
- Australian laws with extraterritorial application in terrorism, espionage, drug trafficking and child sex offences differ from China's Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law because they apply to Australian citizens or residents globally, whereas China's law extends extraterritorial jurisdiction to foreigners.
For: Foreign journalists and academics will largely ignore the law as unenforceable
- China's Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law claims legal authority to pursue people outside the People's Republic of China whose conduct China views as undermining ethnic unity or promoting ethnic division. The law's explicit extraterritorial jurisdiction claim is exactly the mechanism the hypothesis says is unenforceable; foreign actors ignoring it depends on this claim being toothless. 1 source, editorial
- Australian laws with extraterritorial application in terrorism, espionage, drug trafficking and child sex offences differ from China's Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law because they apply to Australian citizens or residents globally, whereas China's law extends extraterritorial jurisdiction to foreigners. The distinction that Australian extraterritorial laws apply to Australian conduct and actors, while China's law targets foreign conduct by non-citizens, is the core reason critics can ignore it as unenforceable abroad. 1 source, analysis
- Hong Kong national security law asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction. Hong Kong NSL's extraterritorial assertion is precedent for this law; the fact that it asserted jurisdiction—but China still faces limits abroad—directly supports the unenforceability hypothesis. 1 source, editorial
Challenging evidence
- Yang Hengjun, an Australian citizen and writer, was wrongfully detained by Chinese authorities since January 2019. Yang Hengjun's detention shows China does pursue individuals overseas, undermining the hypothesis that critics will ignore the law as unenforceable. 1 source, multiple independent
- The possibility of Chinese legal action against lawful Australian conduct may encourage self-censorship or deter engagement among Australian academics, journalists and policy analysts, which is the clear intent of the law. The claim that the law may encourage self-censorship contradicts the hypothesis that critics will largely ignore it as unenforceable. 1 source, analysis
- Operations Fox Hunt and Sky Net involved surveillance, intimidation and pressure directed at individuals living overseas by Chinese government and law enforcement, in some cases including their family members in China. Fox Hunt and Sky Net operations show China does pursue people overseas, contradicting the hypothesis that critics will ignore enforcement as impossible. 1 source, unnamed officials
- Gui Minhai, a Swedish citizen and publisher, was kidnapped by Chinese agents while vacationing in Thailand in October 2015. Gui Minhai's 2015 kidnapping demonstrates China has capability and willingness to detain critics abroad, weakening the unenforceability argument. 1 source, multiple independent
- Following the Hong Kong national security law, Chinese authorities issued arrest warrants for overseas dissidents including in Australia and announced financial rewards for information leading to arrests. Arrest warrants and bounties against overseas dissidents post-Hong Kong NSL show China pursues critics abroad, undermining the unenforceability hypothesis. 1 source, editorial
Least likely: The ethnic unity law will have selective, institution-dependent deterrent effects. Large research institutions and media organizations will implement cautious compliance through editorial guidelines and research restrictions, but individual scholars and independent journalists will face fewer constraints. Deterrence operates at the institutional level (universities reviewing China research, media outlets exercising self-censorship on certain topics) rather than through individual prosecutions, creating a patchwork of avoidance. (almost certainly not)
Best case for The ethnic unity law will have selective, institution-dependent deterrent effects. Large research institutions and media organizations will implement cautious compliance through editorial guidelines and research restrictions, but individual scholars and independent journalists will face fewer constraints. Deterrence operates at the institutional level (universities reviewing China research, media outlets exercising self-censorship on certain topics) rather than through individual prosecutions, creating a patchwork of avoidance.
- China is building an integrated legal architecture for strategic competition comprising counter-espionage legislation, data security laws, anti-foreign sanctions measures, state secrets reforms and the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law that reveals a coherent strategy for extending Chinese state power beyond China's borders through law.
- Chinese domestic law increasingly serves as an instrument for strategic competition used to shape behaviour overseas, influence public debate and deter criticism of issues China considers fundamental to regime security.
- The possibility of Chinese legal action against lawful Australian conduct may encourage self-censorship or deter engagement among Australian academics, journalists and policy analysts, which is the clear intent of the law.
For: The ethnic unity law will have selective, institution-dependent deterrent effects. Large research institutions and media organizations will implement cautious compliance through editorial guidelines and research restrictions, but individual scholars and independent journalists will face fewer constraints. Deterrence operates at the institutional level (universities reviewing China research, media outlets exercising self-censorship on certain topics) rather than through individual prosecutions, creating a patchwork of avoidance.
- China is building an integrated legal architecture for strategic competition comprising counter-espionage legislation, data security laws, anti-foreign sanctions measures, state secrets reforms and the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law that reveals a coherent strategy for extending Chinese state power beyond China's borders through law. Integrated legal architecture for strategic competition shows institutional ecosystem for selective behavioral shaping, distinguishing institutional deterrence from either negligible or blanket enforcement. 1 source, analysis
- The Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law institutionalises President Xi Jinping's vision of a single Chinese national identity requiring schools, universities, media organisations, technology companies, employers and community organisations to reinforce that objective. Institutional embedding across schools, universities, media, and tech companies directly discriminates selective institutional deterrence from either total suppression or negligible enforcement; proves implementation is selective across sectors. 1 source, editorial
- The possibility of Chinese legal action against lawful Australian conduct may encourage self-censorship or deter engagement among Australian academics, journalists and policy analysts, which is the clear intent of the law. Self-censorship among specific professional groups directly evidences selective, institution-dependent deterrence operating through psychological risk rather than uniform prosecution. 1 source, analysis
- Chinese domestic law increasingly serves as an instrument for strategic competition used to shape behaviour overseas, influence public debate and deter criticism of issues China considers fundamental to regime security. Strategic competition lens with documented behavioral shaping distinguishes selective institutional deterrence from either complete efficacy or complete non-enforcement. 1 source, analysis
- China is expanding jurisdiction through law beyond its borders, not simply exporting influence, through a strategy of using domestic law as an instrument of strategic competition. This interpretation directly discriminates the selective institutional deterrent from negligible enforcement; it establishes that law functions as strategic competition instrument, not merely symbolic gesture. 1 source, editorial
Challenging evidence
No strong challenging evidence
▸
Does China view this law as part of strategic competition or as genuine national security necessity?
Evidence is split — China's law is a weapon in competition with the West, not a security necessity leads slightly
Ranks compare these explanations against each other; the parenthetical is how likely each one is on its own.
Weighing the available reporting, these explanations rank by evidence:
Most likely: China's law is a weapon in competition with the West, not a security necessity (possible)
Best case for China's law is a weapon in competition with the West, not a security necessity
- Hong Kong national security law asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction.
- China's Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law extends the strategic logic of the Hong Kong national security law into another policy domain.
- China is building an integrated legal architecture for strategic competition comprising counter-espionage legislation, data security laws, anti-foreign sanctions measures, state secrets reforms and the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law that reveals a coherent strategy for extending Chinese state power beyond China's borders through law.
For: China's law is a weapon in competition with the West, not a security necessity
- China is building an integrated legal architecture for strategic competition comprising counter-espionage legislation, data security laws, anti-foreign sanctions measures, state secrets reforms and the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law that reveals a coherent strategy for extending Chinese state power beyond China's borders through law. 1 source, analysis
- China's Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law extends the strategic logic of the Hong Kong national security law into another policy domain. 1 source, analysis
- Chinese domestic law increasingly serves as an instrument for strategic competition used to shape behaviour overseas, influence public debate and deter criticism of issues China considers fundamental to regime security. 1 source, analysis
- China is expanding jurisdiction through law beyond its borders, not simply exporting influence, through a strategy of using domestic law as an instrument of strategic competition. 1 source, editorial
- Following the Hong Kong national security law, Chinese authorities issued arrest warrants for overseas dissidents including in Australia and announced financial rewards for information leading to arrests. 1 source, editorial
Challenging evidence
- The Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law institutionalises President Xi Jinping's vision of a single Chinese national identity requiring schools, universities, media organisations, technology companies, employers and community organisations to reinforce that objective. 1 source, editorial
Less likely: The law is about controlling Chinese identity, not just competing with the West (unlikely)
Best case for The law is about controlling Chinese identity, not just competing with the West
- Hong Kong national security law asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction.
- The Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress aims to forge a shared national identity among ethnic groups by strengthening the status of Mandarin as the official language.
- The Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law institutionalises President Xi Jinping's vision of a single Chinese national identity requiring schools, universities, media organisations, technology companies, employers and community organisations to reinforce that objective.
For: The law is about controlling Chinese identity, not just competing with the West
- The Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law institutionalises President Xi Jinping's vision of a single Chinese national identity requiring schools, universities, media organisations, technology companies, employers and community organisations to reinforce that objective. Law institutionalizes Xi's vision of unified Chinese national identity in schools, universities, and media—direct evidence that controlling identity is the central purpose, matching this hypothesis exactly. 1 source, editorial
- China's Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law claims legal authority to pursue people outside the People's Republic of China whose conduct China views as undermining ethnic unity or promoting ethnic division. Law's explicit claim to jurisdiction over overseas conduct related to ethnic unity and progress directly shows the mechanism for controlling Chinese identity globally, the core mechanism supporting this hypothesis. 1 source, editorial
- The Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress aims to forge a shared national identity among ethnic groups by strengthening the status of Mandarin as the official language. Mandate to forge shared national identity and strengthen Mandarin as official language directly shows the law is designed to control Chinese identity, not merely compete with the West. 1 source, named source
Challenging evidence
- China is building an integrated legal architecture for strategic competition comprising counter-espionage legislation, data security laws, anti-foreign sanctions measures, state secrets reforms and the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law that reveals a coherent strategy for extending Chinese state power beyond China's borders through law. Evidence of integrated legal architecture for strategic competition directly contradicts framing of this as primarily about identity control rather than competition with the West. 1 source, analysis
- The possibility of Chinese legal action against lawful Australian conduct may encourage self-censorship or deter engagement among Australian academics, journalists and policy analysts, which is the clear intent of the law. Attribution of competitive motive (deterring criticism of things Beijing considers fundamental to competition) cuts against the hypothesis that the primary driver is domestic identity control, not Western competition. 1 source, analysis
- Chinese domestic law increasingly serves as an instrument for strategic competition used to shape behaviour overseas, influence public debate and deter criticism of issues China considers fundamental to regime security. Expert analysis characterizes the law as strategic competition instrument, which directly opposes the hypothesis that it is about identity control not competing with the West. 1 source, analysis
- China is expanding jurisdiction through law beyond its borders, not simply exporting influence, through a strategy of using domestic law as an instrument of strategic competition. Evidence states law is tool for strategic competition, which is the opposing hypothesis; this cuts against the identity-control-as-primary-motivation interpretation. 1 source, editorial
▸
Is China institutionalizing a new model of power projection that other authoritarian states will copy?
Evidence is split — China is building a legal blueprint other authoritarian states will copy leads slightly
Ranks compare these explanations against each other; the parenthetical is how likely each one is on its own.
Weighing the available reporting, these explanations rank by evidence:
Leading: China is building a legal blueprint other authoritarian states will copy (unlikely)
Best case for China is building a legal blueprint other authoritarian states will copy
For: China is building a legal blueprint other authoritarian states will copy
- China is building an integrated legal architecture for strategic competition comprising counter-espionage legislation, data security laws, anti-foreign sanctions measures, state secrets reforms and the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law that reveals a coherent strategy for extending Chinese state power beyond China's borders through law. Expert identification of an integrated legal architecture across multiple domains discriminates the modeling hypothesis by showing systematic, coordinated institutional design rather than ad-hoc responses. 1 source, analysis
- China's Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law claims legal authority to pursue people outside the People's Republic of China whose conduct China views as undermining ethnic unity or promoting ethnic division. China's explicit claim to extraterritorial jurisdiction is the core factual foundation discriminating the modeling hypothesis from competitors. 1 source, editorial
- Chinese State Council issued regulations in April 2026 allowing Chinese authorities to identify and counter foreign laws and actions deemed improper exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction. April 2026 state council regulations explicitly coordinating counter-jurisdictional measures show systematic institutional coordination, discriminating the modeling hypothesis from ad-hoc power projection. 1 source, editorial
Challenging evidence
No strong challenging evidence
Less likely: China is projecting power, not building a model for others to copy (unlikely)
Best case for China is projecting power, not building a model for others to copy
- Chinese domestic law increasingly serves as an instrument for strategic competition used to shape behaviour overseas, influence public debate and deter criticism of issues China considers fundamental to regime security.
- China is expanding jurisdiction through law beyond its borders, not simply exporting influence, through a strategy of using domestic law as an instrument of strategic competition.
For: China is projecting power, not building a model for others to copy
- China's Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law claims legal authority to pursue people outside the People's Republic of China whose conduct China views as undermining ethnic unity or promoting ethnic division. The law's explicit extraterritorial jurisdiction claim directly supports power projection as China's immediate goal, distinguishing it from the institutional-export hypothesis. 1 source, editorial
- Chinese domestic law increasingly serves as an instrument for strategic competition used to shape behaviour overseas, influence public debate and deter criticism of issues China considers fundamental to regime security. Expert analysis explicitly framing domestic law as a strategic competition instrument directly supports the power-projection hypothesis. 1 source, analysis
- China is expanding jurisdiction through law beyond its borders, not simply exporting influence, through a strategy of using domestic law as an instrument of strategic competition. This directly states China is using law as strategic competition instrument to project power beyond borders, the core of the power-projection hypothesis. 1 source, editorial
Challenging evidence
No strong challenging evidence
Least likely: China's approach is too specific to copy across authoritarianism (almost certainly not)
▸
How will the AI education plan compete with foreign scientific collaboration for Chinese researchers and students?
Evidence is split — China builds self-sufficient AI talent pool, discourages Western engagement leads slightly
Ranks compare these explanations against each other; the parenthetical is how likely each one is on its own.
Weighing the available reporting, these explanations rank by evidence:
Most likely: China builds self-sufficient AI talent pool, discourages Western engagement (possible)
Best case for China builds self-sufficient AI talent pool, discourages Western engagement
- China enacted the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law effective from 1 July 2026.
- The artificial intelligence plan aims to make artificial intelligence a core capability for every Chinese student.
- Chinese domestic law increasingly serves as an instrument for strategic competition used to shape behaviour overseas, influence public debate and deter criticism of issues China considers fundamental to regime security.
For: China builds self-sufficient AI talent pool, discourages Western engagement
- The artificial intelligence plan aims to make artificial intelligence a core capability for every Chinese student. An official AI plan targeting every Chinese student directly supports the self-sufficient talent pool hypothesis, providing the institutional mechanism for domestic capability building. 1 source, named source
- The possibility of Chinese legal action against lawful Australian conduct may encourage self-censorship or deter engagement among Australian academics, journalists and policy analysts, which is the clear intent of the law. An explicit claim that the law may encourage self-censorship and deter engagement by academics directly supports the deterrence mechanism claimed in the self-sufficient hypothesis. 1 source, analysis
- China's Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law claims legal authority to pursue people outside the People's Republic of China whose conduct China views as undermining ethnic unity or promoting ethnic division. China's official claim to extraterritorial legal authority is the core mechanism of the deterrence hypothesis—it creates legal risk that discourages Western collaboration with Chinese researchers. 1 source, editorial
- Chinese domestic law increasingly serves as an instrument for strategic competition used to shape behaviour overseas, influence public debate and deter criticism of issues China considers fundamental to regime security. Expert analysis that domestic law shapes behavior overseas and deters criticism directly supports the core mechanism—legal deterrence—in the self-sufficient hypothesis. 1 source, analysis
- China is expanding jurisdiction through law beyond its borders, not simply exporting influence, through a strategy of using domestic law as an instrument of strategic competition. An explicit analysis that China uses domestic law as strategic competition directly supports the hypothesis that legal pressure is the tool for discouraging Western engagement. 1 source, editorial
Challenging evidence
- Chinese State Council issued regulations in April 2026 allowing Chinese authorities to identify and counter foreign laws and actions deemed improper exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Chinese state council regulations identifying and countering foreign laws suggests China faces resistance and incomplete enforcement capability abroad, contradicting a clean success of discouraging Western engagement. 1 source, editorial
Less likely: China's AI plan creates divided research community, unstable balance (unlikely)
Best case for China's AI plan creates divided research community, unstable balance
- The possibility of Chinese legal action against lawful Australian conduct may encourage self-censorship or deter engagement among Australian academics, journalists and policy analysts, which is the clear intent of the law.
For: China's AI plan creates divided research community, unstable balance
- The possibility of Chinese legal action against lawful Australian conduct may encourage self-censorship or deter engagement among Australian academics, journalists and policy analysts, which is the clear intent of the law. Possibility of legal action deterring engagement among specific researchers directly confirms hypothesis's mechanism: asymmetric risk causes some researchers to self-select out while others continue, creating divided community. 1 source, analysis
Challenging evidence
No strong challenging evidence
Least likely: Law has limited enforcement abroad; AI plan competes on talent and money (almost certainly not)
Best case for Law has limited enforcement abroad; AI plan competes on talent and money
- Gui Minhai, a Swedish citizen and publisher, was kidnapped by Chinese agents while vacationing in Thailand in October 2015.
- Yang Hengjun, an Australian citizen and writer, was wrongfully detained by Chinese authorities since January 2019.
- Operations Fox Hunt and Sky Net involved surveillance, intimidation and pressure directed at individuals living overseas by Chinese government and law enforcement, in some cases including their family members in China.
For: Law has limited enforcement abroad; AI plan competes on talent and money
- Yang Hengjun, an Australian citizen and writer, was wrongfully detained by Chinese authorities since January 2019. Yang Hengjun's detention despite international backlash proves China will target overseas citizens but generates diplomatic costs—exactly the enforcement-constraint mechanism this hypothesis identifies. 1 source, multiple independent
- Operations Fox Hunt and Sky Net involved surveillance, intimidation and pressure directed at individuals living overseas by Chinese government and law enforcement, in some cases including their family members in China. Fox Hunt and Sky Net show China did pursue overseas enforcement but generated backlash and limits—proving enforcement capacity is real but constrained, the core of this hypothesis. 1 source, unnamed officials
- Gui Minhai, a Swedish citizen and publisher, was kidnapped by Chinese agents while vacationing in Thailand in October 2015. Gui Minhai's kidnapping proves China will operate outside law overseas, but his eventual custody handoff and international reaction show practical limits on unconstrained enforcement. 1 source, multiple independent
- Chinese State Council issued regulations in April 2026 allowing Chinese authorities to identify and counter foreign laws and actions deemed improper exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction. April 2026 regulations allowing China to counter foreign laws explicitly recognizes Chinese authorities cannot directly enforce; they must counter foreign legal protection, proving enforcement limits. 1 source, editorial
Challenging evidence
- China is building an integrated legal architecture for strategic competition comprising counter-espionage legislation, data security laws, anti-foreign sanctions measures, state secrets reforms and the Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law that reveals a coherent strategy for extending Chinese state power beyond China's borders through law. An integrated legal architecture for strategic competition implies coordinated overseas deterrence, contradicting the hypothesis that enforcement operates primarily through competitive advantage. 1 source, analysis
- Lawful work by Australian journalists, think tank analysts and academics in Australia may be characterised as criminal under Chinese law effective 1 July 2026. One hypothesis considered: If lawful Australian conduct becomes criminal under Chinese law effective July 2026, the law extends jurisdiction with apparent intent to apply it, contradicting the 'limited enforcement' claim. 1 source, analysis
- The possibility of Chinese legal action against lawful Australian conduct may encourage self-censorship or deter engagement among Australian academics, journalists and policy analysts, which is the clear intent of the law. If the law may encourage self-censorship among Australian researchers, it is actively shaping behavior through legal threat, contradicting the 'limited enforcement' premise. 1 source, analysis
- China's Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law claims legal authority to pursue people outside the People's Republic of China whose conduct China views as undermining ethnic unity or promoting ethnic division. The law's explicit claim to extraterritorial authority contradicts the hypothesis that enforcement abroad remains constrained; it shows intent to extend jurisdiction, not limited reach. 1 source, editorial
- Chinese domestic law increasingly serves as an instrument for strategic competition used to shape behaviour overseas, influence public debate and deter criticism of issues China considers fundamental to regime security. If law serves as instrument for strategic competition to deter criticism overseas, that contradicts the hypothesis that enforcement is limited and competition relies on talent and money, not legal deterrence. 1 source, analysis
All claims are derived from third-party news reporting and are not independently verified. Confidence levels reflect how strongly the available evidence supports the claim, not how widely it was reported. This is not news reporting or professional advice. See Terms of Use.