China has undergone several policy shifts, including using reincarnation authority claims based on historical Qing-era conventions, pursuing expanded nuclear deterrent capability through strategic missile tests in September 2024 and July 2026, and moving from ethnic autonomy to forced assimilation policies, while also leveraging electric vehicle proliferation to reduce oil market pressure and employing cultural diplomacy and film screenings as soft power tools to shape international understanding of Chinese values.

For: Harsh sentences are about eliminating political rivals, not justice

• China uses legal tools to punish international compliance with sanctions regimes. Use of legal tools to punish sanctions compliance directly exemplifies the hypothesis that legal mechanisms serve political control rather than impartial justice principles. 1 source, editorial
• China has adapted to predictable international responses to human rights criticism and developed mechanisms to thwart them. Adaptation to international criticism and deliberate thwarting of human rights responses proves China calibrates legal proceedings for political effect, core to the factional-politics hypothesis. 1 source, editorial

For: China is trying to build stronger rule of law within the party

No strong supporting evidence

For: Both factors drive the harsh sentences, not one or the other

• Yang Youlin's death sentence represents one of the harshest sentences handed down in a corruption case in China in recent years. One hypothesis considered: Yang Youlin's harshly severe death sentence directly exemplifies the hypothesis that multiple factors (institutional and political) converge in anti-corruption prosecutions. 1 source, editorial

For: China uses multilateralism as a tool, not a constraint, on rivalry

• China's selective adherence to common rules risks turning its multilateralism into a vehicle to compete with the United States rather than constraining great-power rivalry. Selective rule adherence converting multilateralism into a competitive vehicle directly proves the hypothesis that multilateralism is a tool, not a constraint. 1 source, editorial
• China's missile test on 7 July 2026 indicates a destabilizing expansion of nuclear deployment capability threatening Indo-Pacific stability. July 2026 missile test conducting destabilizing nuclear expansion while simultaneously engaging multilaterally shows multilateralism enables rather than constrains competition. 1 source, analysis
• China risks reproducing elements of the U.S.-led system it wants to replace. China reproducing hierarchical features of the U.S. system directly confirms that its multilateral alternative serves its own competitive interests, not a genuinely different order. 1 source, editorial
• Chinese military capability demonstrated advancement in submarine-based nuclear deterrence systems through the successful ICBM launch. Submarine-based nuclear deterrence advancement shown while pursuing multilateral engagement proves military modernization proceeds independent of multilateral constraint. 1 source, analysis
• China's economic leverage enables China to influence governments that might pressure Beijing over ethnic policy. Economic leverage enabling ethnic-policy defiance of international pressure shows multilateralism constrains nothing when China prioritizes core interests. 1 source, editorial

For: Multilateralism works, but only where China chooses

• China has indicated willingness to help bring Russia to Ukraine peace negotiations. Willingness to mediate on Ukraine shows China can act as responsible multilateral actor where it chooses, directly supporting the hypothesis. 1 source, analysis
• China seeks to reduce tensions with the United States by reframing the relationship around managed competition rather than confrontation while avoiding major concessions on trade or Taiwan. Reframing around managed competition while avoiding concessions perfectly captures the 'works where China chooses' dynamic with explicit boundaries. 1 source, editorial
• Beijing intends to manage competition with Washington to create strategic space to build a global order no longer led by the United States. Managing competition while building alternative order directly exemplifies China choosing multilateralism as tool where it suits competitive interests. 1 source, analysis
• China's ability to define terms of engagement with the United States demonstrates China's growing ability to shape the global agenda. China defining engagement terms demonstrates it exercises choice over where multilateralism constrains it, core to the hypothesis. 1 source, editorial

For: China's cooperation talk hides growing competition

• China's selective adherence to common rules risks turning its multilateralism into a vehicle to compete with the United States rather than constraining great-power rivalry. Selective rule-adherence turning multilateralism into a competitive vehicle directly proves the hypothesis that cooperation talk masks rather than constrains rivalry. 1 source, editorial
• China's missile test on 7 July 2026 indicates a destabilizing expansion of nuclear deployment capability threatening Indo-Pacific stability. A destabilizing missile test directly shows military expansion concurrent with cooperation rhetoric, proving the hypothesis that competition is ongoing despite multilateral engagement. 1 source, analysis
• Chinese military capability demonstrated advancement in submarine-based nuclear deterrence systems through the successful ICBM launch. Submarine-based ICBM advancement is a core strategic military capability expansion occurring alongside cooperation rhetoric, proving competition is real. 1 source, analysis
• China is using the screening of 'Dear You' and diplomatic outreach as a soft power tool to shape international understanding of Chinese culture and values. Cultural soft-power screenings and diplomacy designed to reshape perception, not build authentic connection, exemplify how cooperation rhetoric serves competitive agenda. 1 source, analysis
• China's decades-long investment in temples, Buddhist universities, relic loans, and monk exchanges across Asia serves the purpose of building a constituency of foreign monasteries and sanghas that may be induced to recognize a Beijing-appointed Dalai Lama. Temple investments and monk exchanges framed as soft-power constituency-building exemplify how cooperation-adjacent activities serve competitive influence objectives. 1 source, editorial